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Patterns of Adjustment under the Age of Finance:  
The Case of Turkey as a Peripheral Agent of Neoliberal 
Globalization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Turkey experienced a severe economic and political crisis in November 2000 and again in 
February 2001.  The IMF has been involved with the macro management of the Turkish economy 
both prior and after the crisis, and provided financial assistance of $20.4 billions, net, between 
1999 and 2003.  Following the crisis, Turkey has implemented an orthodox strategy of raising 
interest rates and maintaining an overvalued exchange rate. The government was forced to follow a 
contractionary fiscal policy towards attaining a primary surplus to the 6.5% of the GNP, and 
promised to satisfy the customary IMF demands: reduce subsidies to agriculture, privatize, and 
reduce public sector in economic activity. 
 
Contrary to the traditional stabilization packages that aimed at increasing interest rates to 
constrain the domestic demand, the new orthodoxy aimed at maintaining high interest rates for the 
purpose of attracting speculative foreign capital from the international financial markets.  The end 
results in the Turkish context were the shrinkage of the public sector in a speculative-led growth 
environment; deteriorating education and health infrastructure which necessitate increased public 
funds urgently; and the consequent failure to provide basic social services to the middle classes and 
the poor.  Furthermore, as the domestic industry intensified its import dependence, it was forced 
toward adaptation of increasingly capital-intensive, foreign technologies with adverse 
consequences on domestic employment. 
 
In the meantime the transnational companies and the international finance institutions (the so-
called IFIs) have become the real governors of the country with an implicit veto power over any 
economic and or political decision that is likely to act against the interests of global capital.  
Thereby the fragile Turkish democracy has been placed under siege by the agents of the new-
imperialism. 
 
 
 
 
 
Turkey experienced a severe economic and political crisis in November 2000 and again in 
February 2001.  The crisis erupted when Turkey was following an exchange-rate based 
disinflation programme led and engineered by the IMF.1  Over 2001 the GDP contracted by 
7.4% in real terms, whole sale price inflation soared to 61.6%, and the currency lost 51% of its 
                                                 
1 The underlying elements of the disinflation program and the succeeding crisis are discussed in detail in Akyuz and 
Boratav (2004); Ertugrul and Yeldan (2003), Yeldan, (2002), Boratav and Yeldan (2006), Alper (2001).  See also 
the GPN Report on Turkey, 2005 and the web site of the Independent Social Scientists Alliance 
(www.bagimsizsosyalbilimciler.org) for further documentation of the crisis conditions. 
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value against the major foreign monies.  The burden of adjustment fell disproportionately on the 
laboring classes as the rate of unemployment rose steadily by 2 percentage points in 2001 and 
then another 3 percentage points in 2002.  Real wages fall abruptly by 20% upon impact in 2001 
and could not recover since then as of the time of writing this report.  
 
The IMF has been involved with the macro management of the Turkish economy both prior and 
after the crisis, and provided financial assistance of $20.4 billions, net, between 1999 and 2003.  
Following the crisis, Turkey has implemented an orthodox strategy of raising interest rates and 
maintaining an overvalued exchange rate. The government was forced to follow a contractionary 
fiscal policy, and promised to satisfy the customary IMF demands: reduce subsidies to 
agriculture, privatize, and reduce the role of public sector in economic activity. 
 
The post-crisis economic and political adjustments were overseen by the newly founded Justice 
and Development Party (AKP) which came to power enjoying absolute majority in the 
parliament in the November 2002 elections.  Though maintaining the pro-Islamic political 
agenda, the AKP nevertheless distanced itself from the previous “national View” orthodoxy of 
the traditional Turkish Islamic movement.  The AKP refurbished itself with a more friendly view 
towards the West, ready to do business with the global finance capital and willing to auctioning 
off the strategic public assets to the trans-nationals.  On the political arena, the AKP had given 
unequivocal support to the US interests in the Middle East including the then approaching war in 
Iraq.2  
 
With a new stand-by on which the existing AKP government reached consensus with the IMF in 
2004, the international financial institutions (IFIs) and the Turkish businesses were assured that 
the “reform” process would continue up to 2008 along the course set by the IMF’s structural 
adjustment programme since 1998.   The programme was officially declared as a bundle of 
policies aimed at checking increases in both domestic and external debt and channeling the 
country again to the path of “stable” growth.  However, it is widely known that, beyond what has 
been declared officially, the programme envisages much more radical arrangements in 
restructuring the political and social life as a whole.  It is also common knowledge that the 
primary and the most important target of these arrangements is to eradicate public services and 
related achievements in the fields of social security, education and health, and to commodify 
these services through privatizations.  A critical point to be underlined here is that all of the 
governments of the recent period, including the AKP, have displayed their “most determined” 
political stand (and in turn were hailed as “credible” and “reputable”) together with their full 
neglect to reactions coming from the people and the  working classes.  Taken from this angle, it 
will be safe to assert that Turkey constitutes one of the best examples of those societies where 
only formal aspects of political democracy are observed and nothing more (ISSA, 2006). 
 
In fact, shortly after it has taken office, the AKP abandoned the discourse manipulating anti-
IMF and anti-liberal reactions in the country immediately after taking office and showed no 
hesitation in fully adopting neo-liberal policies entrusting national resources and economic 
future of the country directly to foreign capital and the non-fettered workings of the market.  
                                                 
2 In fact, many analysts draw parallels with the declaration, in the summer months of 2002, of the three-party 
coalition government granting no support for the US plans to invade Iraq and the decision to hold early elections 
later in the same year. 
 3
The distinguishing feature of the AKP government in this respect was that it has undertaken the 
mission of executing the neo-liberal project under the discourse of a “strong government” without 
confronting any strong popular opposition (ISSA, 2006; Cizre and Yeldan, 2005). The AKP had 
acted faster and more boldly than any preceding government in implementing the above 
neoliberal agenda in attempt to respond to the requests of international capital on the one hand, 
and to settle its problem of adaptation to the State and administrative traditions of the country, on 
the other.   
 
It is the purpose of this paper to portray the post-2001 crisis adjustments and the warranted 
transformations in the Turkish political and economic arena under the auspices of the Bretton 
Woods Institutions (The IMF and the World Bank).  The exclusive focus is on the 
macroeconomics of the AKP period, rather than the evolution of the 2001 crisis per se.  The 
paper is organized under 4 sections. In the next section an overview of the Turkish 
macroeconomic adjustments is summarized with the relevant economic evidence. The section 
focuses on the speculative nature of growth with a detailed assessment of the modes of balance 
of payments financing under the AKP era. Section II in turn, takes on the joblessness growth 
patterns and document data on the labor markets.  The deterioration of the position of wage labor 
along with its role in generating the necessary economic surplus under the post-crisis 
adjustments is documented in Section III. Section IV concludes with a discussion on the political 
inferences of the neoliberal reforms of the post-crisis era. 
 
 
I. Post-Crisis Characteristics of Growth 
 
The current IMF program in Turkey relies mainly on two pillars: (1) fiscal austerity that targets a 
6.5 percent surplus for the public sector in its primary budget3 as a ratio to the gross domestic 
product; and (2) a contractionary monetary policy (through an independent central bank) that 
exclusively aims at price stability (via inflation targeting).  Thus, in a nutshell, the Turkish 
government is charged to maintain dual targets: a primary surplus target in fiscal balances (at 
6.5% to the GDP); and an inflation-targeting central bank4 whose sole mandate is to maintain 
price stability and is divorced from all other concerns of macroeconomic aggregates. 
 
According to the logic of the program, successful achievement of the fiscal and monetary targets 
would enhance “credibility” of the Turkish government ensuring reduction in the country risk 
perception.  This would enable reductions in the rate of interest that would then stimulate private 
consumption and fixed investments, paving the way to sustained growth.  Thus, it is alleged that 
what is being implemented is actually an expansionary program of fiscal contraction.   
 
The post-2001 growth had indeed been high.  Annual rate of growth of real GNP averaged 7.8% 
over 2002-2006Q2. Growth, while rapid, had very unique characteristics. Firstly, it was mainly 
driven by a massive inflow of foreign finance capital which in turn was lured by significantly 
high rates of return offered domestically; hence, it was speculative-led in nature (a la Grabel, 
1995).  The main mechanism has been that the high rates of interest prevailing in the Turkish 
                                                 
3 i.,e., balance on non-interest expenditures and aggergate public revenues. The primary surplus target of the central 
government budget was set 5% to the GNP. 
4 The target was set at 5% on consumer price inflation for 2006, and 4% for 2007 and 2008. 
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asset markets attracted short term finance capital, and in return, the relative abundance of foreign 
exchange led to overvaluation of the Lira.  Cheapened foreign exchange costs led to an import 
boom both in consumption and investment goods.  Clearly, achievement of the fiscal contraction 
under severe entrenchment of public non-interest expenditures was a welcome event boosting the 
hungry expectations of the financial arbitrageurs. (See Table 1). The second characteristic of the 
post-2001 era was its jobless-growth pattern.  Rapid rates of growth were accompanied by high 
rates of unemployment and low participation rates.  The rate of unemployment rose to above 
10% after the 2001 crisis, and despite rapid growth, has not come down to its pre-crisis levels (of 
6.5% in 2000).  Furthermore, together with persistent open unemployment, disguised 
unemployment has also risen. According to TURKSTAT data, “persons not looking for a job, 
but ready for employment if offered a job” has increased from 1,060 thousand workers in 2001, 
to 1,936 thousands by 2006, bringing the total (open + disguised) unemployment ratio to 15.5% 
(see Table 6 in section II below). 
 
Together with rapid growth, dis-inflation has been hailed as another area of “success” for the 
AKP government.  The Central Bank has started to follow an open inflation targeting framework 
since January 2006. The Bank’s current mandate is to set a “point” target of 5 percent inflation of 
the consumer prices.  Inflation rate, both in consumer and producer prices, has, in fact, been 
brought under control by 2004. Producer price inflation receded to less than 3% in late 2005. 
After the brief turbulence in the asset markets in May-July 2006, inflation again accelerated to 
above 10% and could only be brought under control gradually to 9.6% towards the end of 2006. 
 
Despite the positive achievements on the dis-inflation front, rates of interest remained slow to 
adjust.  The real rate of interest on the government debt instruments (GDIs) for instance 
remained above 10% over most of the post-crisis period and generated heavy pressures against 
the fiscal authority in meeting its debt obligations.  (See figure 1). The persistence of the real 
interest rates, on the other hand, had also been conducive in attracting heavy flows of short term 
speculative finance capital over 2003 and 2005.  This pattern continued into 2006 at an even 
stronger rate. 
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IMF-Led          
Dis-inflation 
Programme Crisis
Under 3-party 
Coalition 
Government
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006.Q3
GNP Growth Rate 6.3 -9.5 7.9 5.9 9.9 7.6 7.8
Inflation (CPI, 12 months averages) 54.9 54.4 44.9 25.3 10.6 8.2 9.61
Real Wage Growth (%)2 2.1 -20.1 1.1 5.1 3.9 -0.1 1.3
Unemployment Rate (%) 6.5 8.4 10.3 10.5 10.2 10.2 8.8
Budget balance / GNP (%) -10.9 -16.2 -14.3 -11.2 -7.1 -2.0 -0.62
Non-Interest Primary Budget Balance / GNP (%) 5.7 6.8 4.3 5.2 6.1 7.4 6.3
Central Adm. Domestic Debt (Billions $) 58.0 84.9 91.7 139.3 167.3 182.4 173.1
Central Adm. Domestic Debt / GNP (%) 29.0 69.2 54.5 54.5 52.3 50.3 45.72
Total External Debt Stock (Billions $) 118.5 113.6 130.1 144.9 162.2 171.1 198.3
External Debt / GNP (%) 59.3 78.0 71.9 60.6 54.2 47.4 52.42
Foreign Trade Balance (Billions $) -23.8 -7.1 -11.4 -18.2 -30.6 -39.8 -32.0
        Exports (fob, billions $) 30.7 34.3 40.1 51.1 66.9 76.7 63.9
        Imports (cif, billions $) 54.5 41.4 51.5 69.3 97.5 116.5 95.9
Current Account Balance (Billions $) -9.8 3.4 -1.5 -8.1 -15.6 -23.1 -25.3
Current Account Balance / GNP (%) -4.9 2.3 -0.8 -2.8 -5.3 -6.4 -6.72
Source: TR Central Bank (www.tcmb.gov.tr); Undersecretariat of Treasury (www.treasury.gov.tr)
1. As of end of 2006.
2. As a ratio of last four quarters.
IMF-Led Post-Crisis Adjustments
Under Pragmatic and Western-friendly Islamism of the AKP
Table 1. Key Macroeconomic Indicators, Turkey
 
 
 
 
Inertia of the real rate of interest is enigmatic from the successful macro economic performance 
achieved thus far on the fiscal front.  Even though one traces a decline in the general plateau of 
the real interest rates, the Turkish interest charges are observed to remain significantly higher 
than those prevailing in most emerging market economies.  The credit interest rate, in particular, 
has been stagnant at the rate 16% despite the deceleration of price inflation until the May-July 
turbulence. Since then the credit interest rates accelerated to 23.5% (Turkstat, 2006).  
 
 
Figure 1. Inflation (WPI, 1994 = 100) and Real Interest Rate on GDIs 
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High rates of interest were conducive in generating a high inflow of hot money finance to the 
Turkish financial markets. The most direct effect of the surge in foreign finance capital over this 
period was felt in the foreign exchange market.  The over-abundance of foreign exchange 
supplied by the foreign financial arbitrageurs seeking positive yields led significant pressures for 
the Turkish Lira to appreciate.  As the Turkish Central Bank has restricted its monetary policies 
only to the control of price inflation, and left the value of the domestic currency to the 
speculative decisions of the market forces, the Lira appreciated by as much as 40% in real terms 
against the US$ and by 25% against Euro (in producer price parity conditions). 
 
Figure 2 portrays the paths of the bilateral (vis-à-vis the US$) and the trade-weighted real 
exchange rate (in PPP terms, with producer prices as the deflator) over 2000-2006.  The currency 
crises of November 2000 through February 2001 are clearly visible in the figure.  The recent blip 
in May-July 2006, on the other hand, has had a minimal effect on the real value of the real 
exchange rate and did not suffice to change the direction of the course of ongoing real 
appreciation. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Indexes of the Bilateral and Trade-Weighted Real Exchange Rate  
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I-1. Components of Balance of Payments and External Debt 
 
The structural overvaluation of the TL, not surprisingly, manifests itself in ever-expanding 
deficits on the commodity trade and current account balances.  As traditional Turkish exports 
lose their competitiveness, new export lines emerge. Yet, these proved to be mostly import-
dependent, assembly-line industries, such as automotive parts and consumer durables.  They use 
the advantage of cheap import materials, get assembled in Turkey at low value added and then 
are re-directed for export.  Thus, being mostly import-dependent, they have a low capacity to 
generate value added and employment.  As traditional exports dwindle, the newly emerging 
export industries had not been vigorous enough to close the trade gap. 
 
Consequently, starting in 2003 Turkey has witnessed expanding current account deficits, with the 
figure in the third quarter of 2006 reaching a record-breaking magnitude of $25.3 billion, or 
6.7% as a ratio to the aggregate GNP. In appreciation of this figure, it has to be noted that Turkey 
traditionally has never been a current account deficit-prone economy. Over the last two decades 
(80s and 90s) the average of the current account balance hovered around plus and minus 1.5-
2.0%, with deficits exceeding 3% signaling for significant currency adjustments as had been in 
1994 and 2001.  In fact, the mechanics behind the culminating current account deficit of the post-
2001 period can only be understood in the context of the speculative transactions embedded in 
the Finance account of the BOP.  Table 2 summarizes the relevant data.   
 
 
 
Table 2. Selected Indicators on Balance of Payments and Foreign Debt (Millions US$) 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006Q3
Total over 
2006Q3-2003
Exports (fob) 34,373 40,124 51,206 67,047 76,595 63,916 258,764
Imports (fob) -38,106 -47,407 -65,216 -90,925 -109,171 -95,922 -361,234
Trade Balance -3,733 -7,283 -14,010 -23,878 -32,576 -32,006 -102,470
Current Account Balance 3,392 -1,524 -8,037 -15,604 -22,852 -25,334 -71,827
Finance Account Balance -14,643 1,161 7,098 17,679 44,069 34,462 103,308
    Foreign Direct Investment by Residents Abroad -497 -175 -499 -859 -1,047 -361 -2,766
    Foreign Direct Investment by Non-Residents 3,352 1,137 1,752 2,847 9,650 12,804 27,053
    Non-Residents' Portfolio Investments in Turkey -3,727 1,503 3,851 9,411 14,670 4,849 32,781
    Residents' Portfolio Investments Abroad -788 -2,096 -1,386 -1,388 -961 -1,284 -5,019
   Other Investment, Net -12,983 792 3,380 7,668 21,757 18,454 51,259
Net Errors and Emissions -1,759 118 4,941 2,267 1,983 -659 8,532
Change in  Reserves (-: Increase) 12,924 212 -4,097 -4,342 -23,200 -8,469 -40,108
Foreign Debt Stock 113,592 130,093 144,915 162,202 171,078 198,261 68,168
      Short Term Foreign Debt Stock 16,403 16,424 23,013 32,569 38,247 43,322 26,898
Ratio of  Short Term Foreign Debt Stock to Central Bank 
Reserves 0.87 0.61 0.68 0.90 0.76 0.74 ..
Source: TR Central Bank (www.tcmb.gov.tr)  
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Data in Table 2 indicate that the finance account has depicted a net surplus of 103.3 billion over 
the “AKP period”, 2003 through 2006 (September).  About half of this sum ($151.2 billion) was 
due to credit financing of the banking sector and the non-bank enterprises, while a third ($32.8 
billion) originated from non-residents’ portfolio investments in Turkey. Residents have exported 
financial capital at the magnitude of $5.4 billion, and if one interprets the net errors and 
omissions term of the BOP accounts as an indicator of domestic hot money flows (see e.g. 6and 
Akyuz, 2004; Boratav and Yeldan, 2005), the total sum of net speculative finance capital inflows 
is calculated to reach $36.2 billion over the three years of the post-crisis adjustments.   
 
The foreign direct investment (FDI) is taken as an important source of financing the current 
account deficit especially after 2005.  It is true that the BOP data reveal a sudden increase in the 
flow of FDI monies totaling $22.4 billion in the last two years.  However, looking at the FDI 
more closely, it would be revealed that the bulk of the aforementioned flow had been due to 
privatization receipts plus real estate and land purchases by foreigners.  Neither of these items 
are sustainable sources of foreign exchange, and they were driven by speculative arbitrage 
opportunities rather than enhancing the real physical capital stock of the domestic economy.  In 
fact as reported by the ANKA researchers, the stock of “hot money” has reached to $52.3 billion 
as of August 2006.  This stock is fed upon three sources: (i) foreigners’ holdings of government 
debt instruments (£17.9 billion) and (ii) of securities at the Istanbul Stock Exchange Market 
($30.6 billion); and (iii) foreign exchange deposits at the banking sector ($3.7 billion).  The 
aggregate stock of hot money reaches to two-thirds of the cumulative current account deficit over 
the post-2001 crisis period. 
 
A significant detrimental nature of hot money led balance of payments financing is its foreign 
debt intensity.  As reported in Table 2, the stock of external debt has increased by a total of $63.5 
billion over the end of 2002 to the second quarter of 2006 (the most recent data available at the 
time of writing). This indicates a cumulative increase at a rate of 48.8% in US dollar terms over a 
period of 3.5 years.  Despite this rapid increase, the burden of external debt as a ratio to the GNP 
has fallen from 71.9% (2002) to 47.4% (2005).  This fall is due to both the rapid expansion of the 
GNP and the unprecedented appreciation of the Lira over the period.  The appreciation of TL 
disguises much of the fragility associated with both the level and the external debt induced 
financing of the current account deficits.  A simple purchasing power parity “correction” of the 
real exchange rate, for instance, would increase the burden of external debt to 76.8% as a ratio to 
the GNP in 2005.5  This would bring the debt burden ratio to the 2001 pre-crisis level.  Under 
conditions of the floating foreign exchange regime, this observation reveals a persistent fragility 
for the Turkish external markets, as a possible depreciation of the Lira in the days to come may 
severely worsen the current account financing possibilities.  This persistent external fragility is 
actually one of the main reasons why Turkey had been hit the hardest among the emerging 
market economies in the May-June 2006 turbulence (IMF, 2006).   
 
Another facet of the external fragility of the Turkish balance of payments regards the 
composition of debt. As far as the post-2001 era is concerned, two critical features of external 
debt driven current account financing have been that, (i) the foreign debt accumulation was 
                                                 
5 Measured in 2002 producer prices. If the PPP-correction is calculated in 2000 prices, the revised debt to GNP ratio 
reaches to 82.3%. 
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mostly of short term duration; and (ii) it was mostly driven by the non-financial private sector, 
rather than the public sector.  I document the relevant data in Table 3. 
 
 
 
Table 3. Composition of External Debt Stock (Millions US$) 
2000Q4 2001Q4 2002Q4 2003Q4 2004Q4 2005Q4 2006Q3
2006Q3 - 2002Q4 
Increase
External Debt Stock (1 + 2) 118,504 113,592 130,093 144,915 162,202 171,078 198,261 68,168
(1) Short Term Foreign Debt 28,301 16,403 16,424 23,013 32,569 38,247 43,322 26,898
     Banks 16,900 7,997 6,344 9,692 14,529 17,740 19,828 13,484
     Other Sectors 9,748 7,654 8,425 10,461 14,753 17,744 20,897 12,472
     TR Central Bank 653 752 1,655 2,860 3,287 2,763 2,774 1,119
(2) Medium-Long Term Debt 90,203 97,189 113,669 121,902 129,633 132,831 154,939 41,270
    (2.1) Public Sector 47,621 46,110 63,618 69,503 73,825 68,114 68,660 5,042
    (2.2)  TR Central Bank 13,429 23,591 20,340 21,504 18,114 12,654 12,921 -7,419
   (2.3)  Private Sector 29,153 27,488 29,711 30,895 37,694 52,063 73,358 43,647
   (2.3.1) Financial Enterprises 7,581 4,789 4,637 5,060 8,284 15,316 21,264 16,627
               Banks 4,550 3,211 3,026 3,140 5,750 12,231 17,310 14,284
               Non-Bank Financial 3,032 1,578 1,611 1,920 2,534 3,085 3,954 2,343
   (2.3.2) Non-Financial Enterprises 21,571 22,699 25,074 25,835 29,410 36,747 52,094 27,020
Source: Undersecreteriat of Treasury (www.hazine.gov.tr)  
 
 
 
 
As Table 3 attests, of the accumulated foreign debt of $68.2 billion over the AKP era, 43% was 
short term in maturity.  Turkey’s external short term debt stock, which had reached to $28.3 
billion just before the eruption of the February 2001 crisis, was reduced to as low as $13.7 billion 
in the first quarter of 2002.  The stock of short term debt has increased rapidly, especially after 
2003, to reach $43.3 billion as of the third quarter of 2006.  A critical account of this episode 
pertain the ratio of short term debt to central bank’s international reserves.  This ratio is regarded 
as one of the crucial leading indicators of external fragility (see, e.g., Kaminsky et.al., 1999), and 
has been interpreted as the “most robust predictor of a currency crisis” in Rodrik and Velasco 
(1999).  The path of this indicator over the post-2001 period is summarized in the last row of 
Table 3. 
 
As the ratio of short term external debt to CB international reserves rise, it signals a “fall” in the 
capability of the CB to meet the external liabilities of the domestic economy, and is interpreted 
as worsening of external fragility.  This ratio stood at 0.87 by the end of 20016, and after 
receding to 0.61 in early 2002, rose up to 0.92 by the third quarter of 2005.  It is brought back to 
0.74 by the third quarter of 2006, thanks mainly to very rapid build-up of foreign exchange 
reserves by the Turkish Central bank in the past year.  By way of comparison, the 
aforementioned “fragility ratio” was 0.60 in Malaysia, 0.91 in the Philippines, and 1.50 in 
Thailand just before the break down of the 1997 Asian crisis. Thus, it can be argued that 0.60 is 
                                                 
6 The ratio of short term foreign debt to CB international reserves was 1.47 just before the eruption of the February 
2001 crisis. 
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regarded as a critical threshold from an international speculation point of view (see, e.g., 
Kaminsky et.al, 1999).7   
 
The preceding discussion indicates that despite the brief deceleration of the turbulence of May-
June, Turkish economy continued to increase its intensity of external debt accumulation in 2006.  
Available data of the first nine months of 2006 is a manifest of this as summarized in Table 4 
below. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Main Components of the Balance of Payments in 2006 (Millions US$) 
J a n  -  S e p t 
2 0 0 5
J a n  -  S e p t 
2 0 0 6 D iffe re n c e
C u rre n t A c c o u n t B a la n c e -1 5 ,8 7 0 -2 5 ,3 3 4 -9 ,4 6 4
C a p ita l O r ig in a tin g  f ro m  F o re ig n  
S o u rc e s 2 5 ,8 2 1 3 8 ,1 0 8 1 2 ,2 8 7
C a p ita l O r ig in a tin g  f ro m  D o m e s tic  
S o u rc e s -4 ,0 5 2 -7 ,1 8 8 -3 ,1 3 6
C h a n g e  in  R e s e rve s  (" -"  in d ic a te s  
in c re a s e ) -8 ,5 6 1 -4 ,9 2 7 n .a .
N e t E rro rs  a n d  O m is s io n s 2 ,6 6 2 -6 5 9 -3 ,3 2 1
N e t C a p ita l In f lo w 2 4 ,4 3 1 3 0 ,2 6 1 5 ,8 3 0
F o re ig n  D e b t In d u c in g  C a p ita l In f lo w s 1 7 ,2 9 1 2 3 ,7 0 5 6 ,4 1 4
N e t H o t M o n e y  F lo w s 1 1 ,9 5 9 -1 ,8 6 9 -1 3 ,8 2 8
S o u rc e s : B o ra ta v , 2 0 0 6 ; T R  C e n tra l B a n k .  
 
 
 
 
In table 4 we distinguish the BOP data of January-September 2006 over two axes: first is the 
decomposition of the in/out-flows of foreign capital into two sources: by the foreign non-
residents versus domestic residents.  Capital inflows originating from the foreign sources are 
observed to increase by 48% over the comparable period of 2005, and reached to $38.1 billion.  
The domestic source, on the other hand, displayed an out-flowing tendency and had been on the 
order of $-7.2 billion.  This figure comprises outflows due to operations of the banking sector 
and the enterprises, as well as the domestic rentiers’ decisions.  Taking account of the net errors 
and omissions figure of $-0.7 billion, the overall net foreign capital inflow into Turkey reached 
to $30.3 billion, a 24% increase over the same period of 2005. 
                                                 
7 See also Goldstein (2005) for a recent evaluation of the external fragility accross emerging market economies, 
where Turkey is reprotedly found to display above average fragility indexes among comparable economies.  See 
also the IMF’s 2006 report on Turkey for further discussion. 
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Data reveal that a significant deceleration of the hot money component of this transfer ($-1.9 
billion), as the domestic outflows of hot money had outpaced the speculative inflows of non-
residents.  Consequently, the role of hot money financing of the balance of payments is reduced 
in the first nine months of 2006.  The period further reveals, however, a 37.7% increase in net 
foreign indebtedness, to reach $23.7 billion.  Given that the public sector is currently following a 
strict austerity programme, and has generated a sizable primary surplus, this increase in foreign 
debt has originated mainly from the private sector —and mainly by the non-banking, private 
enterprise sector (see Table 3).  The external debt obligations of the private sector ($73.4 billion) 
now exceeds aggregate public foreign debt ($68.6 billion) as of third quarter of 2006.   
 
Within the private sector, non-financial enterprises explain 60% of the aggregate increase of 
private external debt over the post-2002 AKP period and accounts for 70.9% of the total stock of 
private debt by 2006Q3. (See Figure 3). 
 
 
 
Figure 3. External Debt By Sectors 
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Source: TR Central Bank, www.tcmb.gov.tr
 
 
 
I-2. The “IMF Program” 
 
The rapid increase of private sector debt —both by the financial and non-financial sectors alike, 
reveals the true essence of the IMF-engineered adjustment mechanisms following the currency 
and banking crises of February 2001.  The underlying characteristics of the Turkish post-crisis 
adjustments ultimately relied on maintaining high real rates of interest in anticipation of 
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increased foreign capital inflow into the domestic economy.  Coupled with an overall 
contractionary fiscal policy, the programme found the main source of expansion in speculative 
inflows of foreign finance.  Persistent offerings of high rates of interest against the back-drop of 
lower inflation and fiscal primary surplus targets were the main attributes of the IMF programme 
as implemented both by the three-party coalition government under Mr. Bulent Ecevit (until 
November, 2002) and by the AKP government (post-November, 2002).   
 
The aforementioned elements of this adjustment path were clearly stated, in fact, in the Turkey 
Country Report prepared by the IMF staff in late 2001. Table 5 below makes a reference to that 
2001 report which had laid out the macroeconomic targets of the post-crisis adjustment path as 
envisaged by the IMF.  It is very illuminating to note that the targets of the 2001 IMF Report 
encompassing 2002 through 2006 have eventually become the official targets of both 
governments over that period.  The targeted rate of real GNP growth, for instance, was 
persistently set at 5% for each coming year, despite the observed rapid expansion of the economy 
in rates often exceeding 7% in the preceding year! This choice was clearly no coincidence.  
Likewise, the inflation targets of the “independent” central bank each year followed the path 
envisaged in the 2001 IMF Report, beginning with 20% of 2003 to 5% in 2006. (Note that the 
Turkish CB has declared the onset of its official inflation targeting monetary regime in January 
1, 2006).   
 
Finally, the very sanctimonious primary surplus target of the public sector at 6.5% as a ratio to 
the GNP clearly finds its origins in the aforementioned report. 
 
 
 
Table 5. Macroeconomic Targets of the Current IMF Programme 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
GNP Real Growth Rate 3.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
Non-Interest Budget balance / GNP (%) 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.3
Inflation Rate 35.0 20.0 12.0 8.0 5.0
Nominal Rate of Interest on Domestic Debt 69.6 46.0 32.4 27.4 23.9
REAL Rate of Interest on Domestic Debt 25.6 21.7 18.2 18.0 18.0
Source : IMF, 2001 Turkey Country Report (www.imf.org )  
 
 
 
That being said, what remains noteworthy is the IMF’s choice of a very high and persistent real 
interest rate targeted at 18% throughout the programming horizon.  The real interest rate target is 
persistently kept at its very high level despite the falling trajectory of the inflation rate.  In 
comparison of the Figure 1 above where the realized rates of inflation and real interest were 
disclosed, the persistence of the high level of real interest rate against falling inflation rates seem 
to find a resonance in the adjustment path assumed by the IMF staff in the immediate post-2001 
crisis.  It is clear that the main adjustment mechanism of the post-crisis IMF programme was 
embedded in maintaining a significantly high rate of real interest.  The high interest rates 
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attracted short term finance capital; and the relative abundance of foreign exchange led to 
overvaluation of the Lira.  Cheapened foreign exchange costs led to an import boom both in 
consumption and investment goods.  Achievement of the fiscal contraction under severe 
entrenchment of public non-interest expenditures, in turn, was a welcome event further boosting 
the hungry expectations of the financial arbiters.  
 
In sum, contrary to the traditional stabilization packages that aimed at increasing interest rates to 
constrain the domestic demand, the new orthodoxy aimed at maintaining high interest rates for 
the purpose of attracting speculative foreign capital from the international financial markets.  
The end results in the Turkish context were the shrinkage of the public sector in a speculative-led 
growth environment; deteriorating education and health infrastructure which necessitate 
increased public funds urgently; and the consequent failure to provide basic social services to the 
middle classes and the poor.  Furthermore, as the domestic industry intensified its import 
dependence, it was forced toward adaptation of increasingly capital-intensive, foreign 
technologies with adverse consequences on domestic employment.  It is to this issue now I turn. 
 
 
 
II. Persistent Unemployment and Jobless Growth 
 
Another key characteristic of the post-2001 Turkish growth path has been its “jobless” nature.  
The rate of open unemployment was 6.5% in 2000; increased to 10.3% in 2002, and remained at 
that plateau despite the rapid surges in GDP and exports. Open unemployment is a severe 
problem, in particular, among the young urban labor force reaching 26%.  Table 6 tabulates 
pertinent data on the Turkish labor market. 
 
 
Table 6. Developments in the Turkish Labor Market (1,000 persons) 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006Q3
15+ Age Population 46,209 47,158 48,041 48,912 49,906 50,991 51,770
Civilian Labor Force 23,078 23,491 23,818 23,640 24,289 24,989 25,622
Civilian Employment 21,581 21,524 21,354 21,147 21,791 22,566 23,279
Unemployed (Open) 1,497 1,958 2,473 2,497 2,479 2,509 2,343
Open Unemployment Ratio (%) 6.5 8.4 10.4 10.5 10.3 10.2 9.1
Disguised Unemploymenta 1,139 1,060 1,020 945 1,223 1,714 1,936
Total Unemployment Ratiob (%) 10.9 12.3 14.1 14.0 14.5 15.8 15.5
Civilian Employment by Sectors
    Agriculture 7,103 8,089 7,458 7,385 7,400 6,661 6,809
    Industry 3,738 3,774 3,954 3,821 3,988 4,360 4,429
    Services 9,738 9,661 9,942 10,080 10,403 11,545 12,041
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT), Household Labor Force Surveys.
b. Total (open + disguised) unemployment accounting for the persons "not in labor force".
a. Persons not looking for a job yet ready to work if offered a job: (i) Seeking employment and ready to work within 15 days, and 
yet did not use any of the job search channels in the last 3 months; plus (ii) discouraged workers.
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The civilian labor force (ages 15+) is observed to reach 51.8 millions people as of 2006Q3. On 
the other hand, the participation rate fluctuates around 48% to 50%, due mostly to the seasonal 
effects.  It is known, in general that, the participation rate is less than the EU averages. This low 
rate is principally due to women choosing to remain outside the labor force, a common feature of 
Islamic societies, but its recent debacle depends as much on the size of the discouraged workers 
who had lost their hopes for finding jobs. If we add the TURKSTAT data on the underemployed 
people, the excess labor supply (unemployed + underemployed) is observed to reach 15.5% of 
the labor force as of the third quarter of 2006. 
 
Yet the most striking observation on the Turkish labor markets over the post-2001 crisis era is 
the sluggishly slow performance of employment generation capacity of the economy. Despite the 
very rapid growth performance across industry and services, employment growth has been 
meager.  This observation, which actually is attributed to many developing economies as well,8 
is characterized by the phrase jobless-growth in the literature.  In Turkey this problem manifests 
itself in insufficient employment generation despite the very rapid growth conjuncture especially 
after 2002.  
 
To make this assessment clearer I plot the quarterly growth rates in real gross domestic product 
in Figure 4, and contrast the y-o-y annualized rates of change in labor employment.  In order to 
make comparisons meaningful, the changes in labor employment is calculated relative to the 
same quarter of the previous year.  
 
 
 
Figure 4. Annual Rate of Change in GDP and Aggregate Employment 
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Source: Turkish Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT), Household Labor Force Surveys. 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 See, e.g., UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report, (2002 and 2003). 
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The figure discloses that between 2002.Q1 and 2006.Q3 the average rate of growth in real GDP 
was 7.5%. In contrast the rate of change of employment averaged only 0.8% over the same 
period. Over the nineteen quarters portrayed in the figure, GDP growth was positive in all 
periods. Yet, labor employment growth was negative in 9 of those 19 quarters.   
 
The sectoral breakdown of the post-crisis employment patterns reveals a massive de-population 
in the rural economy.  Agricultural employment has been reduced by 1,289 thousand workers 
since 2001. Against this fall, there had been a total increase of employment in the services 
sectors by 2,380 thousand, and by 655 thousand in industry.  Simultaneous to this was the overall 
expansion of the aggregate labor supply from 47.158 million in 2001 to 51.770 million in 2006, 
adding to the acuteness of the joblessness problem. 
 
Thus, in conclusion, two important characteristics of the post-crisis adjustment path stand out: 
first is that the post-2001 expansion is observed to be concomitant with a deteriorating external 
disequilibrium, which in turn is the end result of excessive inflows of speculative finance capital, 
and was named “speculative-led” in the preceding section. Secondly, the output growth contrasts 
with persistent unemployment, warranting the term “jobless growth”.  
 
A further detrimental impact of the speculative-led, jobless growth era had been the overall 
decline in the labor participation rates.  Even though lower than the comparable member 
countries of the European Union, labor participation rates were nevertheless above 50% during 
most of the 1990s.  The participation rate declined to less than the 50% threshold  first during the 
implementation of the 2000 exchange rate-based dis-inflation programme.  It continued its 
secular decline over the rest of the decade and its trend is depicted in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5. Labor Participation Rate and Total Unemployment 
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Source: Turkish Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT), Household Labor Force Surveys. 
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III. Wage-Labor as the Absorber of the Burden of Adjustments 
 
Such a transfer of the financial surplus through very high real interest rates offered to the 
financial system would, no doubt, call for repercussions on the primary categories of income 
distribution.  It is clear that creation of such a financial surplus would directly necessitate a 
squeeze of the wage fund and a transfer of the surplus away from wage-labor towards capital 
incomes, in general.  It is possible to find evidence to the extend of this surplus transfer from the 
path of the manufacturing real wages.  I portray the dynamics of the manufacturing real wages in 
Figure 6, and offer contrasts against productivity of labor. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Real Wages and Labor Productivity in Turkish Manufacturing Industry 
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Source: Turkish Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT) 
 
 
 
The index of labor productivity, measured in real output per hours, shows a rapid increase with 
its level reaching to 158 index points (1997=100) by 2006Q3.  Over the same period, wage 
remunerations, on the other, declined by a cumulative 23.8% in real terms.  This exercise shows 
very clearly, how in the Turkish economy speculative financial gains were financed through 
squeezing of real wages.  Each rapid rise in the financial returns has been closely associated with 
a downward movement of real wages and involved a direct transfer from labor incomes towards 
capital, both domestic and foreign9.  The real wages contracted severely after the 2001 February 
crisis and this downward trend was maintained throughout 2002 and 2003. 
 
                                                 
9 See also Yeldan (2006) for a more detailed assessment of the labor’s position under the post-crisis adjustments of 
the Turkish economy. 
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A case can further be made here that the ongoing process of surplus transfer from wage-labor to 
the financial-industrial conglomerates is nothing new, and not unique to Turkey, either. Capital’s 
assault on labor has, in fact, continued with new forms of industrial organization at the onset of 
neo-liberal globalization in mid-70s.  With intensified policy changes towards flexibility and 
privatization, position of wage-labor eroded everywhere.  This process was most visible in the 
US, the hegemonic center of global capitalism.  In order to depict this phenomenon, I will adhere 
to the path of real wages and real labor productivity in US manufacturing in the second half of 
the 20th century. (See Figure 7).  As clearly visible, the Fordist period under the Keynesian 
policies had been associated with real wages following to a large extend the movements in labor 
productivity up until 1970s.  The late 1970s, however, reveal the extend of capital’s gains against 
labor. As the real wage rate stagnated, its path remained significantly below the real average 
product of labor, the gap yielding the increased exploitation of wage labor in the last quarter of 
the century.10
 
 
 
FIGURE 7. Labor Productivity and Hourly Real wages in US Manufacturing (1950 = 100) 
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Source: "The New Face of Capitalism: Slow Growth, Excess Capital and A Mountain of Debt" 
Monthly Review, editors, 2002. (www.monthlyreview.org/0402.editr.htm) 
 
 
                                                 
10 See, e.g., Moseley (2001) and the series of reports by the Economic Policy Insititue on the position of the US 
labor. 
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A different facet of this observation was at play across the Atlantic as well.  Figure 8 below 
contrasts the US wage labor’s position with that of Turkey.  The figure portrays comparable data 
and the verdict remains exactly the same.  Wage rates of the Turkish manufacturing labor follow 
the average real product until 1980, and under conditions of military dictatorship during the 
1980s, a significant wedge is created among the real wage earnings and real labor productivity 
by way of intensified exploitation of labor. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Labor Productivity and Real Wages in Turkish Manufacturing (1950-2005) 
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Source: TURKSTAT, Annual Manufacturing Surveys. 
 
 
 
 
Clearly very similar processes had been operational both at the North and South under neoliberal 
globalization.  The end of the Fordist technological organizations led to the demise of the welfare 
state which enabled a comparatively tolerant attitude towards wage labor.  As this delicate 
balance on mass production for domestic consumption eroded, capital has found a new 
opportunity in financial returns. Overall this process has led to the demise of the welfare state 
and an outright hostile attitude against the rights of labor. 
 
As a result, share of labor in national incomes fell everywhere.  According to Petras and 
Veltmeyer (2000) and Diwan’s (1999) data, share of wage labor fell from 48% (1970) to 28% 
(1985) in Chile; from 41% (1970) to 25% (1989) in Argentina; from 37% (1970) to 27% (1989) 
in Mexico; from 40% (1970) to 17% (1986) in Peru.  Similarly, according to calculations of 
Yeldan (2000, Chapter III) the share of wage labor in manufacturing value added was reduced 
from 28% in 1976 to 15% by 1987. 
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This abrupt shift in the distribution of income against labor coincided with the assault against 
indigenous strategies for economic development and against the fragile democracies of the 
“South”.   
 
 
 
IV. Conclusion: From “Fiscal” to “Democracy” Deficit 
 
The detrimental consequences of the neoliberal adjustment path on wage-labor were not limited 
only to the economic sphere.  Labor’s position was further curtailed as the developing country 
governments that are dependent upon foreign capital have been conditioned to adopt or maintain 
contractionary policies in order to secure “investor confidence” and “international 
creditworthiness”.  Such efforts are restricted to a balanced budget, entrenched fiscal 
expenditures, and a relatively contractionary monetary policy with an ex ante commitment to 
high real interest rates.  All of this signify reduced political autonomy in the developing world in 
exchange for market access to industrialized North, and itself is a bad bargain as far as 
development is concerned (Rodrik, 2001). 
 
In this environment portfolio investors become the ultimate arbiters of national macroeconomic 
policy (Cizre-Sakallioglu and Yeldan, 2000; Grabel, 1996) and any effective public policy is 
now regarded as synonymous to populism and waste.  Democratic institutions are put under 
siege through endless lists of conditionalities set forth by the IMF and the World Bank, and in 
the meantime, the transnational companies and the international finance institutions (IFIs) have 
become the real governors with an implicit veto power over any economic and/or political 
decision that is likely to act against the interests of global capital.  The IFIs report rating scores 
in aligning the indigenous economies under the strategic realm of finance capital.  Even direct 
political decisions are under scrutiny.  
 
A critical example here is the rejected war motion by the Turkish parliament, disapproving the 
US troops to utilize the Turkish soil in the early days of the Iraq’s invasion.  In exchange for a 
total aid of 24 billion dollars, USA had asked permission from Turkey to use its borders with 
Iraq. The motion was rejected and a chaos ensued driven by the IFIs and their rating agencies.  
The following excerpt from Morgan Stanley Economic Forum on Turkey, is a typical example: 
(March 4, 2003). 
 
“the latest parliamentary decision to reject the much-debated ‘war motion’ is 
such a risk that will no doubt disturb the fragile equilibrium...(Turkey) is 
unlikely to get the promised $24 billion that would ease pressure on the 
domestic debt market...”  
 
The report concludes with the stunning question:  
 
“what happens if the parliament does not altogether vote for the 
economic reforms, arguing that 80% of the Turkish population is 
against the IMF program?”   
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Thus, the report is not only concerned with the loss of 24 billion dollars liquidity for the Turkish 
financial centers, but is also worried that the people may further exercise their rights over the 
future of the IMF-led austerity program in Turkey.  In the classic words of Diaz-Alejandro 
(1985), a twist can also be mentioned: “Good-bye Budget deficits, hello democracy deficit...”. 
 
In the words of the 2005 Annual Report of the ISSA, two important consequences of these 
transformations come to the fore as the basic problem of almost all countries including Turkey: 
Speaking in broad terms, these are related to the transfer of decisions relating to the public sphere 
from constitutional institutions of respective countries to “independent” supreme bodies of 
regulation working under global rules and further commercialisation of the public services and the 
overall body of public economic activity including decision making and regulation (ISSA, 2006: 
4).  This process, whose legitimization is presented as “dissecting politics from economics” 
enhances the hegemony of global capital and its domestic extensions on society by keeping large 
sections of people and working masses afar from political processes. Political leaders in all 
countries where these reforms are being implemented commonly refer to clumsily working “old” 
state and bureaucratic structures, also lamed by corruption; and the new model is championed by 
reference to its so–called efficient, strong, rule-abiding and accountable features.   Any reader with 
further interest in a more elaborate and advanced analysis of these reforms and the new State in 
agenda as well as the new public sphere may refer to any website managed by IMF, WB, OECD or 
EU.  
 
Reports containing mentioned policy suggestions not only define necessary measures and 
arrangements to be adopted, but also go as far as advising ways of securing public support in this 
field. The example below is from an OECD Report (2002) titled Regulatory Reforms in Turkey: 
Important Support to Economic Improvement: Governance: 
“...It is vital to have open communication channels in order to have continued 
public support for the reforms.  There is a need for dissemination of the targets and 
the advantages of the regulatory reforms. Another benefit of this approach is to 
eliminate the widespread public view that the reforms are imposed from abroad. 
For this reason, the public perception should be treated as an important issue 
within the communication strategy of the government.” (page 11, underlined 
emphasis added). 
 
Assessing the processes which the so-called “emerging market economies” have undergone 
under the onset of neoliberal globalization, it becomes clearer that what has been pursued is not 
simply a stride to “stabilize” the economic structures, but goes much beyond it to radically alter 
the social structures of those nations. The executing actors include political circles who shut their 
ears to reactions coming from different segments of society, justify their stance by repeating “it 
is us who decide on policies to be adopted” and maintain these policies at any cost whatsoever 
while keeping themselves content with the slogan “firm commitment is a virtue”. These top level 
bureaucrats, whom we can classify as “global elites”, often share the same mode of living and 
discourse worldwide.  Extremely intolerant to any criticism including very innocent ones, these 
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groups may well behave far distant from what can be given as the sine qua non of any 
democracy. 
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